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Changing The Probability Versus Changing The Reward
By: David M. Bruner
                                                                                Abstract 
There are two means of changing the expected value of a risk: changing the probability of a 
reward or changing the reward. Theoretically, the former produces a greater change in expected 
utility for risk-averse agents. This paper uses two formats of a risk preference elicitation 
mechanism under two decision frames to test this hypothesis. After controlling for decision 
error, probability weighting, and order effects, subjects, on average, are slightly risk averse and 
prefer an increase in the expected value of a risk due to increasing the probability over a 
compensated increase in the reward. There is substantial across-format inconsistency but very 
little within-format inconsistency at the individual level.
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1 Introduction 
Any gamble is composed of a set of possible outcomes and a probability distribution 
over those outcomes. The expected value of a gamble may be changed equivalently by 
changing the set of outcomes, the probability distribution, or both. Equivalent changes in 
the expected value, however, do not imply equivalent changes in risk. Suppose the 
expected value of a gamble is increased by changing the probability distribution and, 
equivalently, by changing the set of outcomes. The former produces a greater increase 
in expected utility (EU) than the latter for a risk averse agent. The question is, do risk 
averse people actually prefer changing the probability to changing the reward? EU 
theory says they will. Nonetheless, there is little definitive evidence to support this 
prediction since naturally occurring data do not satisfy the strict requirements necessary 
for an empirical investigation. A commonly used laboratory method for eliciting risk 
preferences can, however, allowing for a direct test of this implication of EU theory. 
The most commonly used method of eliciting risk preference requires a respondent to 
make a series of dichotomous choices over lottery pairs. As the respondent proceeds 
through the series, the lotteries’ expected values are increased to eventually induce her 
to switch from choosing the less risky to the more risky choice. The point at which she 
switches provides an estimate of risk preference. An attractive feature of this 
mechanism is the ability to control how the expected values are increased through the 
series. The researcher can manipulate either the probability distribution or the set of 
payoffs and, thus, achieve the variation that is required for statistical identification while 
changing the expected value of the lottery equivalently, as required by theory. By 
design, the mechanism provides the necessary observability in decisions and risk 
preference. The observability and variation provided by risk preference elicitation makes 
it a natural choice to test the hypothesis. 
This paper provides the most rigorous test, to date, of the EU prediction that risk-averse 
people prefer changing the probability to changing the reward. The paper presents the 
results from an experiment in which respondents are presented with two formats of the 
described risk preference elicitation mechanism, in one of two two decision frames. The 
formats refer to how the expected values of the lotteries are varied. The expected value 
of the lotteries in the series varies through either probability variation (PV), where the 
probability of a reward changes holding the reward constant, or reward variation (RV), 
where the reward varies holding its probability constant. The decision frames refer to 
the presentation of the menu of choices. The menu of choices was presented in either 
ascending order or a random order. Casual comparison of subject choices across 
frames and formats reveals a preference for increasing the probability relative to 
increasing the reward in the ascending frame. In the random frame, subjects do not 
appear to prefer one to the other. This suggests decision frame matters. Structural 
estimates of the parameter of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), however, that 
control for decision error and order effects are statistically equivalent across format and 
frame. Hence, the apparent framing effect disappears. These estimates indicates that 
subjects, on average, were risk averse and preferred an increase in the probability to a 
compensated increase in the reward of a gamble. The results are robust across two of 
the most common specifications of stochastic error and there is little evidence of 
probability weighting. Inspection of the data at the individual-level reveals within-format 
inconsistency is rare but across-format inconsistency is substantial. In the ascending 
order decision frame, 2.83% and 9.43% of subjects in the PV and RV formats, 
respectively, switched from the safe to the risky choice multiple times. Strangely, this 
type if inconsistency decreased in the random order decision frame; 0.00% and 7.84% 
of subjects in the PV and RV formats, respectively, switched multiple times. Casual 
inspection of individual responses across formats indicates roughly 55% of the sample 
either over- or under-reacted relative to the theoretical prediction under the assumption 
of CRRA. 
 
The results have implications beyond the laboratory, most obviously for problems of 
compliance, such as tax evasion, environmental regulation, corporate governance, and 
social law. In fact, the theoretical prediction was first discussed by Becker (1968) in his 
seminal paper on crime and punishment. A regulator has a choice of two instruments to 
increase compliance: increased monitoring of agents (changing the probability) or 
increased penalties for non-compliant behavior (changing the outcome). EU theory 
predicts that increased penalties will have a larger deterrent effect on risk-averse 
agents. Thus, central to the debate on punishment certainty versus severity is whether 
risky decision-making can be explained reasonably well with EU theory. General 
findings of directional effects does not directly test EU theory. The experiment 
presented in this paper directly tests whether both the direction and magnitude of the 
difference in relative elasticities is consistent with EU theory; formally testing the 
equivalence of elicited risk preference achieves both. The results from the econometric 
analysis are consistent with previous findings (Anderson and Stafford, 2003, 2006; 
Block and Gerety, 1995; Grogger, 1991; Myers, 1983; Witte, 1980). 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives Becker’s result and accounts for 
possible confounding factors. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 
presents the results from the experiment. Section 5 summarizes the results and 
discusses their implications. 
 
2 Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Expected Utility Theory 
Consider a binary lottery that yields a reward y with probability p or 0 with probability 1 − 
p. The expected value of the lottery is EV = py. Suppose the expected value of the 
lottery is to be increased, EV > 0. This could be accomplished by changing the 
probability of obtaining the reward, so that EV = y p, or by changing the size of the 
reward, so that EV = p y. Let increasing the expected value by changing the 
probability be referred to as probability variation (PV) and changing the expected value 
by changing the reward be referred to as reward variation (RV). 
 
An agent’s expected utility (EU) from the lottery is EU = pU(y), where U(y) is a 
monotonically increasing function of y.8 If U(y) is concave, U^n(y) < 0, then the agent is 
risk averse; if U(y) is convex, U^n(y) > 0, then the agent is risk seeking; if U(y) is linear, 
U00(y) = 0, then the agent is risk neutral. 
Consider how equivalent changes in the expected value of the lottery affect the EU from 
the lottery. PV results in a change in EU that is equal to  
 
(1)    
 
where the second equality uses the result _p = _EV y . RV results in a change in EU 
that is approximately equal to 
 
(2)    
 
where the second equality uses the result y = EV/p . Thus, for equivalent increases 
in the expected value of the lottery, the increase in the expected utility from the lottery is 
greater (lower) with probability variation than with reward variation for risk averse 
(seeking) agents. 
 
 
Figure 1: Change in expected utility with PV and RV 
 
The result is shown in Figure 1 for a risk averse agent. Initially, the expected value of 
the lottery is EV0 = p0y0, which has a corresponding expected utility of EU0. Then the 
expected value of the lottery is increased by PV, p = p1 − p0, and RV, y = y1 − y0. 
The new expected value of the lottery is EV1 = p0y1 with RV and EV1 = p1y0 with PV. 
The new EU corresponding to the RV lottery is EURV 1 and the new expected utility 
corresponding to the PV lottery is EUPV 1. Since the new EU is greater with PV than 
with RV, EURV 1 < EUPV 1, the change in the EU is greater with PV than with RV, 
EUPV > EURV . 
 
2.2 Risk Preference Estimation 
The methodology used to elicit risk preferences requires a respondent to make a series, 
j = 1 . . . J, of dichotomous choices. Each decision involves a choice between a binary 
lottery, where the reward is yj with probability pj and 0 with probability (1 − pj), or a 
guaranteed amount, μ. The expected value, EVj = pjyj , of each lottery j is increased, 
EVj > EVj−1, from j = 2 to J to induce the respondent choose the lottery over the 
guaranteed amount for all j _ j_. The decision j_ at which the respondent begins 
choosing the lottery over the guaranteed amount provides an interval estimate of risk 
preference. 
 
Estimation of risk preference requires specification of a stochastic component to the 
decision making process. The literature has produced several different approaches to 
modeling the stochastic error process. To date, the stochastic process has been 
modeled as a ‘trembling hand’ (Harless and Camerer, 1994), traditional white noise 
(Fechner, 1860/1966; Luce, 1959), and random preferences (Becker et al., 1963). By 
far, the most popular are the Fechner (1860/1966) and Luce (1959) models.10 As such, 
the analysis estimates both models for the comparison between the PV and RV formats. 
 
Assume respondent i’s preferences over potentially random distributions of income are 
given by the popular constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function where the EU 
from lottery j is . Further assume each respondent i maximizes his 
stochastic EU, , where  and k indexes the 
choices. Let k = 1 denote the guaranteed amount and k = 0 denote the lottery. The 
probability respondent i chooses the guaranteed amount is  
 
(3)    
 
where "i = "i1−"i0 is a noise parameter to be estimated. This is the Fechner (1860/1966) 
model of stochastic choice under risk. Following standard probit models, the latent 
Fechner index, , is assumed to be the argument of the cumulative 
probability density function for the standard normal distribution. Alternatively, the Luce 
(1959) model, assumes the probability respondent i chooses the guaranteed amount is 
 
(4)    
 
where " is a noise parameter to be estimated. Thus, respondent i’s decision depends on 
the ratio of the choices rather than the difference between the choices. Notice the latent 
Luce index is already defined in terms of a cumulative probability density function. The 
analysis estimates the models in equations (3) and (4) for both the PV and RV formats 
and then test the equivalence of the risk aversion parameter across formats. Estimation 
of both models avoids making inferences based on what Wilcox (2007) refers to as a 
‘stochastic identifying restriction’. 
2.3 Probability Weighting 
The predicted difference in responses between the PV and RV formats is due to the 
linearity of EU in probability space and non-linearity of EU in income space. There is 
evidence, however, that suggests preferences are not linear in probabilities (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Camerer and Ho, 1994; Prelec, 
1998; Gonzalez andWu, 1999; Stott, 2006). Therefore, we allow for more flexibility in 
preferences by incorporating a probability weighting function. We assume that 
. That is, we estimate a rank-dependent expected utility function to 
compliment estimates of expected utility. Following Tversky and Kahneman (1992) we 
assume the following weighting function: 
 
(5)    
 
where pj is the probability of getting the reward for lottery j and  represents the curvature 
parameter. Hence, for 0 <  < 1 ( > 1) respondents overweight (underweight) small 
probabilities and underweight (overweight) large probabilities. The previous EU models 
essentially impose the constraint = 1. Estimation of a probability weighting function 
will permit investigation into the influence of the EU restriction on the comparison 
between the PV and RV formats. 
 
2.4 Decision Frame 
It has been suggested that the menu of choices in the elicitation mechanism may be 
subject to framing effects (Andersen et al., 2006). That is, when the menu of choices 
are presented in an ascending order (the most common decision frame), a 
psychological ‘bias towards the middle’ may induce a risk averse (seeking) respondent 
to switch from the safe to the risky choice at a lower (higher) expected value than they 
may otherwise. It is important to ensure that the experimental results are not 
confounded by such an effect. 
 
There are two possible remedies: (i) a random order decision frame such that the 
expected value of the lottery is in random order from one row to the next or (ii) a skewed 
decision frame that omits lotteries from the menu of decisions (so respondents make 
fewer decisions and less information regarding preferences is revealed). Andersen et al. 
(2006) argue that the latter is superior for reasons of cognitive difficulty and noisiness in 
the data. While there may be validity to their argument, a skewed decision frame 
changes the bounds on the implied risk preference parameter. Thus, employing a 
skewed decision frame could result in a difference in elicited risk preference across 
formats that is strictly due to the change in the implied bounds on the risk preference 
parameter. Therefore the experiment implements a single random order decision frame 
in addition to the traditional ascending order decision frame. Assuming risk averse 
respondents, any psychological ‘bias towards the middle’ should manifest itself in lower 
estimates of risk aversion in the ascending menu, which is potentially confounded by 
such a framing effect, relative to the random menu, which removes the confound. 
 
3 Experimental Design 
The experiment was conducted to test whether a risk-averse respondent is more 
sensitive to probability variation versus reward variation. EU theory suggests subjects’ 
responses should systematically vary with the elicitation format (i.e. whether the 
researcher employs a PV or a RV format). A within-subjects design was used to test the 
prediction; the same subjects are presented with both formats. In addition, a between-
subjects design was used to control for possible framing effects; subjects are exposed 
to one of two decision frames. The ascending frame presented lotteries in ascending 
order while the random frame presented lotteries in a single randomized order. 
 
Table 1: Decisions for PV and RV Formats and Ascending and Random Frames 
 
 
Both the PV and RV formats presented subjects with 10 decisions, each required them 
to choose between a lottery and a guaranteed $5. The difference between the formats 
was the means by which the expected payout of the lottery was changed. Table 1 
presents each of the 10 lotteries for the PV and the RV formats under both the 
ascending order and the random order decision frames.15 In the PV format, the reward 
was held constant at $10 while the probability of a reward was varied from 10% to 100% 
in increments of 10%. In the RV format, the probability of a reward was held constant at 
50% while the reward varied from $2 to $20 in $2 increments. The low reward was held 
constant at zero in both formats. This was done to make both the expected value and 
the change in the expected value of the lotteries in the PV and RV formats equivalent in 
order to be consistent with the theoretical argument in the previous section. 
 
In either format, a risk-averse subject should switch from choosing the guaranteed $5 to 
choosing the lottery when the expected value of the lottery is greater than $5. According 
to EU theory, the increase in EU from the PV lottery is greater than the increase in EU 
from the corresponding RV lottery for each expected value from $6 to $10 for a risk-
averse subject. This implies a sufficiently risk averse subject should switch to the lottery 
at a lower expected value in the PV format than in the RV format. 
 
In addition to the the PV and the RV formats, subjects in the ascending order decision 
frames were required to make decisions in a third format. This format will be referred to 
as lottery variation (LV). The LV format required subjects to choose between the 
lotteries in the PV and the RV formats. The purpose of the LV format was not relevant to 
testing the hypothesis in this paper and therefore the data is not included in the 
analysis. It is necessary, however, to acknowledge the potential that a difference in the 
observed choice pattern between the PV and RV formats could be affected by exposure 
to the LV format. The experiment was designed to control for this effect. 
 
Experimental sessions consisted of three stages in the ascending order decision frame 
and two stages in the random order decision frame. In each stage, a different format 
was presented. As a result each subject was exposed to both the PV and RV formats 
and made 10 decisions in each. The order in which the formats were presented was 
randomly assigned to subjects within a session to achieve orthogonal orderings. This 
randomization controls for possible session effects, such as time of day, as well as any  
 
Table 2: Experimental Design 
 
 
potential confounding effect that previous formats (including the LV format) may have 
on the decisions in subsequent formats. For example, if the three formats were 
presented in the order LV in stage 1, RV in stage 2, and PV in stage 3, the comparison 
between the PV and the RV formats could potentially be biased if decisions in stages 2 
and 3 were influenced by the exposure to the previous format(s).18 Table 2 presents 
the experimental design. 
 
Prior to making any decisions, subjects were presented with instructions on the 
computer screen. Subjects were informed in advance that they would be making 10 
decisions in each stage. Subjects were told each decision would be between a lottery 
and another choice, where the computer would use the specified probabilities to 
determine the outcome of the lottery. Furthermore, subjects were told before they saw 
any instructions on their screens that only one of their decisions would determine their 
earnings in the experiment. The selection of the each subject’s decision that determined 
their payoff was presented as a compound lottery; the computer first selected the stage 
of the experiment (each had a 1/3 chance of being selected) and then the decision of 
the selected stage was chosen (each had a 1/10 chance of being selected). Thus, it is 
assumed that preferences conform to the Independence Axiom (Samuelson, 1952). The 
evidence in the literature suggests that ‘random lottery selection’ is incentive-compatible 
for simple choice sets (Ballinger and Wilcox, 1997; Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Wilcox, 
1993). 
 
Subjects were given instructions pertaining to the stage (which reiterated much of the 
general instructions) and shown an example decision screen prior to making any 
decisions for a particular stage. Upon completion of the decisions in a stage, subjects 
moved on to the subsequent stage. After completion of the final stage, subjects were 
shown the stage and the decision that was selected by the computer for payment, as 
well as the outcome of the lottery if chosen. Subjects were paid individually in private 
after completing some demographic and debriefing questions. At no time was any 
deception used in the experiment. 
 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Calgary. The subject pool is 
composed of volunteer students at the university. Subjects were recruited by email via 
the lab’s Online Recruitment System for Experimental Economics (ORSEE) (Greiner, 
2004). The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software Z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Experimental sessions lasted approximately 35 minutes and 
average earnings were $12 including a $5 show-up fee. A total of 157 subjects 
participated; 106 subjects participated in the ascending order decision frame and 51 
subjects participated in the random order decision frame. 
 
4 Analysis and Results 
EU theory implies sufficiently risk averse subjects should make fewer safe choices in 
the PV format relative to the RV format. The analysis begins by comparing the 
proportion of subjects that chose the guaranteed $5, for each decision across formats 
and frames. Then the data is used to construct bounds on the implied CRRA parameter 
for each subject to determine the distribution of risk preferences. These interval 
estimates are used to investigate, at the individual level, the degree of consistency with 
EU theory. Finally, using the microeconometric framework described in Section 2.2, a 
test for a difference in the average CRRA parameter across the formats and decision 
frames is conducted.  A statistical equivalence in the estimated CRRA parameter across 
formats suggests subjects are being consistent with the behavior implied by ‘noisy’ EU 
maximization. 
 
4.1 Comparison of Safe Choices in PV and RV formats 
Figure 2 plots the proportion of the sample that chose the safe choice for each decision 
in both the PV and the RV formats. The left panel presents the data for the ascending 
order decision frame and the right panel presents the data from the random order 
decision frame. For the ascending order decision frame, a lower proportion of subjects 
chose the guaranteed $5 over the lottery in the PV format relative to the RV format in 
the region where risk averse subjects should switch (expected values 6 - 10).23 This 
pattern of choices is consistent with the prediction that the EU from the lottery is 
increasing more under PV relative to RV for a risk averse subject. The result 
disappears, however, when the random order decision frame is plotted, as can be seen 
in the right panel. The proportion of subjects that chose the guaranteed $5 for each 
decision is virtually identical across formats. This pattern of choices is indicative of 
some sort of framing effect. 
 
Two-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are conducted on the distribution of choices for 
each decision. This is a nonparametric test of the hypothesis that the distributions  
 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of sample choosing the guaranteed amount. 
 
of matched pairs of observations are the same. The test statistics for equivalence in the 
proportion of safe choices between the two formats in the ascending order decision 
frame for expected values $8, $9, and $10 all reject the null hypothesis at a 5% level of 
significance. Thus, the distributions of choices in the two formats for the ascending 
order decision frame are statistically different from each other in the direction that is 
consistent with the theoretical prediction. This result disappears when the random order 
decision frame is analyzed, as the test statistics are no longer significant. 
 
Table 3: Risk Preference Classification Based on Lottery Choices 
 
 
Since subjects make 10 decisions in each format, bounds on the implied risk aversion 
parameter can be constructed based on the number of safe choices. Table 3 shows the 
ranges of the implied risk aversion parameter in columns 2 and 3 for the PV and the RV 
formats, respectively, assuming a CRRA utility function. The table indicates that the 
majority of subjects were risk averse. Thus, risk aversion is a likely explanation for the 
difference in choices displayed in the left panel of figure 2, as EU theory suggests. 
While the distribution of risk preferences clearly changes across decision frames, the 
change is not consistent with a psychological ‘bias towards the middle’. In either the PV 
or the RV format, the distribution of risk preferences is more concentrated towards the 
middle (4, 5, or 6 safe choices) in the random order decision frame than the ascending 
order decision frame. 
 
Table 4: Number of Safe Choices in PV and RV Formats 
 
 
It is worthwhile to investigate the extent to which the aggregate results are 
representative of individual subject behavior. Table 4 summarizes the number of safe 
choices made by each subject in the PV and the RV formats. Using the ranges of the 
implied CRRA parameter from table 3, individual inconsistencies across formats can be 
identified, as indicated by bold numbers. These are subjects whose implied CRRA 
parameters do not overlap across formats. Italic numbers indicate subjects that 
consistently revealed preferences across the two formats, or at least the implied CRRA 
parameters overlap. 
 
Indeed there are a large number of inconsistencies. Approximately 58% of the sample 
either over- or under-reacted relative to the theoretical prediction under the assumption 
of CRRA.27 Despite the inconsistencies across formats, there were few inconsistencies 
within formats. 1.91% of subjects in the PV format and 8.92% of subjects in the RV 
format switched multiple times. Still, the question remains, can these inconsistencies be 
explained by noise in the decision process? 
 
4.2 Estimated CRRA Risk Parameter 
The micoreconometric models presented in Section 2.2 are used to test whether 
estimates of the average CRRA parameter are statistically equivalent across the two 
formats. The estimates under both models of the stochastic error process are reported. 
The estimation results for the Fechner (1860/1966) model from equation (3) are shown 
in the first and second columns of table 5. The estimation results for the Luce (1959) 
model from equation (4) are shown in the third and fourth columns of table 5. The first 
and third columns report estimates on data pooled across both formats and frames. The 
second and fourth columns report estimates of the CRRA parameter when it is allowed 
to vary across formats and frames. Dummy variables to indicate format and frame 
combinations are included. The baseline case, captured by the constant term, is the PV 
format with an ascending order decision frame. All models are estimated using 
maximum likelihood assuming clustered errors to account for repeated observations on 
the same subject. 
 
The estimation results in the second and fourth columns demonstrate the effects of  
 
Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of CRRA Utility 
 
 
format and frame on elicited risk preferences. There is no statistical difference in the 
estimated average CRRA parameter across formats, as indicated by the insignificance 
of the estimated coefficient on the dummy variables for the RV format with an ascending 
order decision frame and those for the PV and RV formats in the random order decision 
frame. This also implies there is no statistical difference in the estimated average CRRA 
parameter across decision frames, although these are different subjects. Furthermore, 
statistical significance aside, the estimated coefficients are all negative. Recall, a 
psychological ‘bias towards the middle’ should manifest itself in lower estimates of risk 
aversion in the ascending frame. The estimated parameters, however, indicate that the 
random frame elicited a lower average CRRA parameter, as indicated by the negative 
signs on the dummy variables for the random order decision frame. Hence, the data 
reject the hypothesis of a psychological ‘bias towards the middle’. Thus, after allowing 
for a stochastic error process and controlling for order effects, the consistency of 
responses across formats in the ascending order also holds in the random order 
decision frame. 
 
Finally, the analysis investigates the extent to which the results are influenced by the 
EU restriction on the probability weighting parameter in equation (5). By design, the PV 
format has no variation in payoffs and the RV format has no variation in probabilities. 
The lack of variation makes simultaneous estimation of the curvature of the utility 
function and the curvature of the probability weighting function impossible. In order to 
obtain sufficient variation in the parameters of interest, the data is pooled across 
formats and frames and estimate the structural parameters under both the Fechner 
(1860/1966) and Luce (1959) models. The results are reported in columns 5 and 6 of 
table 5, respectively. As can be seen, the estimated average CRRA parameters are 
quite close to the corresponding estimates without probability weighting reported in 
columns 1 and 3, respectively. Furthermore, the estimated probability weighting 
parameters are close to unity. Thus, to the extent that probability weighting occurs, it 
does not appear to be severe. 
 
5 Discussion 
The question posed at the outset of this paper asked whether risk-averse individuals 
prefer an increase in the expected value of a lottery due to increasing the probability of 
winning to doing so by increasing the reward? The answer is a qualified yes. Casual 
comparison of subject choices in figure 2 reveals a preference for increasing the 
probability of winning in the ascending frame, although subjects in the random frame do 
not appear to prefer one to the other. Structural estimates of the CRRA parameter, that 
control for decision error and order effects, however, are statistically equivalent across 
formats and frames. These estimates indicate subjects were, on average, risk averse 
and preferred an increase in the probability to an increase in the reward. The results are 
robust across the two most popular models stochastic error and do not appear to be 
severely influenced by probability weighting. 
 
The results have implications beyond the laboratory, most notably for compliance 
problems. Whether increasing the certainty of apprehension or the severity of 
punishment, if apprehended, is the larger deterrent is still an issue of debate. To date, 
empirical studies of naturally occurring individual-level data have been limited to 
released arrestees (Grogger, 1991; Myers, 1983; Witte, 1980). It is not clear that 
released arrestees are the appropriate sample to address the question. As Grogger 
(1991) points out, individuals who have been imprisoned may have such poor labor 
market opportunities that they will prefer criminal activities regardless of the 
enforcement regime. As such, the results from these studies have been mixed (Witte, 
1980; Myers, 1983; Grogger, 1991). 
 
In an effort to reconcile differences between criminals and the general population, Block 
and Gerety (1995) conducted a novel experiment that analyzed the behavior of 
university students relative to convicted felons in a cartel game. They found that felons 
are more responsive to punishment certainty, in agreement with Witte (1980) and 
Grogger (1991), while students are more sensitive to punishment severity, as has been 
cited Anderson and Stafford (2003, 2006). This evidence suggests that criminals have a 
preference for risk while the general population, as represented by university students, 
is risk averse. When Block and Gerety (1995) elicited the risk preferences of convicts 
and students, however, they found no difference between the two groups. Furthermore, 
the general finding of directional effects, while important does not directly test EU 
theory. Individuals may still under- or overreact relative to EU predictions. From table 4, 
approximately 58% of subjects in the experiment either over- or under-reacted relative 
to the theoretical prediction under the assumption of CRRA. Assuming the PV CRRA 
parameter is accurate, 18.47% (39.49%) of subjects make too many (few) safe choices 
in the RV format. Conversely, assuming the RV CRRA parameter is accurate, 39.49% 
(18.47%) of subjects make too many (few) safe choices in the PV format. Still, the 
microeconometric analysis suggests subject behavior, on average, is consistent with 
previous findings (Anderson and Stafford, 2003, 2006; Block and Gerety, 1995; 
Grogger, 1991; Myers, 1983; Witte, 1980). 
 
The design employed in this experiment carefully manipulated the decision frame. 
Andersen et al. (2006) provide some evidence of a framing effect based on a skewed 
version of the menu of lottery choices. In their review of the literature, Harrison and 
Rutstrom (2008, p. 47) state “that there may be some slight framing effect, but it is not 
systematic ... ”. The results from this experiment are consistent with this assessment; 
they reveal some slight framing effect but it does not appear to be systematic either. 
Clearly, the data do not support a psychological ‘bias towards the middle’. In the 
random frame, intended to remove such a confound, the distribution of risk preferences 
is actually more concentrated towards the middle. This is confirmed by the negative 
effect, albeit insignificant, of the random frame on the estimated CRRA parameter. 
 
Finally, the percentage of subjects that switch from safe to risky multiple times within a 
format is quite low in either decision frame. Hey and Orme (1994), Ballinger and Wilcox 
(1997), and Loomes et al. (2002) all report a significant amount of multiple switching 
behavior when they present lottery choices individually and in random order. Andersen 
et al. (2006) observe a significant reduction in multiple switching behavior when they 
include an indifference option with the presentation of choices as a menu; suggesting 
such behavior is a signal of indifference. This experiment results in a similarly low rate 
of multiple switching behavior through the use of additional verbal instruction, 
emphasizing the random lottery selection procedure, before the experiment began 
combined with the presentation of choices as a menu. Hopefully future research will 
provide a systematic investigation into the nature of multiple switching behavior, as this 
will likely shed light on the nature of the stochastic error process. Overall, the risk 
preference elicitation mechanism used in this experiment appears to be robust not only 
to variation in format, but also variation in frame. 
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